Deconstructing the mental health crisis in only 2 pieces Ridha Joober, MD, PhD
In their editorial in this issue of JPN, Merali and Anisman 1 proposed a deconstruction of the mental health crisis in "5 uneasy pieces." While a crisis may exist, there may be di vergence on how to define this crisis, how it can be decon structed and how we can move beyond it. First, from Merali and Anisman's use of the term "treat ment" almost always being synonymous with pharmaco logical treatment, their quasisilence on nonpharmacological treatments and from the type of research they are promoting, it can be deduced that the crisis the authors described is mainly one of biological psychiatry. Second, there is certainly a crisis in mental health, which encompasses more than bio logical psychiatry, but I believe that the nature of the 2 crises and the responses that they require may be very different and probably at times antagonistic. So I propose to decon struct the crisis into 2 pieces: biological psychiatry and men tal health.
The crisis in biological psychiatry
Merali and Anisman present 3 key points on the crisis in bio logical psychiatry: big pharmaceutical companies are with drawing from the field, advanced technologies have failed to provide any clinical utility in psychiatry, and very little pro gress has been made in identifying biomarkers for mental disorders. What also adds to the evidence of this crisis is the contrast with the rest of the medical domains, where impor tant advances in drug discovery, diagnostics and biomarkers have been made. Indeed, one can only wonder how little bio logical psychiatry has done in the field of therapeutics since the initial serendipitous discovery of the major classes of psycho tropic medications. Certainly, the safety and tolerabil ity profiles of many classes of psychotropics have been im proved, but no new biological targets or more efficacious medications have been identified despite tremendous efforts deployed and billions of dollars spent. To cite 1 example, the most effective medications in modifying behaviours, methyl phenidate and amphetamine, which are used for the treat ment of attentiondeficit/hyperactivity disorder, have been around for more than 70 years and have yet to be surpassed. Thousands of brain imaging studies (including studies ori ginating from my own research group) have failed to go be yond the now trivial report of statistical group differences be tween patients and controls with regard to some indices in brain parameters. It might be easy to say that something will happen if we keep enlarging our networks and waiting for the next new technology; however, after decades of this atti tude persisting, the industry, the funding agencies, the phi lanthropists, the public in general, a large contingent of scien tists working in the field and, most importantly, patients and their families are losing faith.
According to the renowned philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn, a crisis in a specific domain of science arises when the scientific community starts to lose faith in their paradigm. Is the field of biological psychiatry in crisis? The question is open, but there are strong and robust indicators that this might indeed be the case. One of these indicators is the loss of faith of many, as Merali and Anisman alluded to in their editorial. But most importantly, there are findings and atti tudes in biological psychiatry that point to the deep schism between biological psychiatry and mental health. Most of the psychiatric disorders have very strong genetic underpin nings, and biological psychiatry has done an outstanding job identifying the genetic variants increasing the risk for these disorders: thousands of genetic variations, each with a very small effect size, are at play. The "dusty" nature of these ef fects seem to be more true for highly prevalent disordersthose with the highest cost for society, like depression and anxiety. To give a recent example, a large metaanalysis of genomewide association studies in neuroticism and depres sion identified a single highly significant but weak (odds ratio = 1.04) association with a single nucleotide polymor phism using a sample of more than 63 000 individuals! This result could not be replicated in a sample of 9786 individ uals. 2 The question is how can we act on this knowledge? Op timists would say we will do something and rush to press re leases. However, it is sobering to remind ourselves how the community of biological psychiatry has failed in the past to act on much stronger associations. Because suicide may be a very good sentinel indicator of how well psychiatry is con tributing to improved mental health, and because unfortu nately the news is not so good on this front, 3 I will use 2 ex amples to illustrate this failure of action. The dexamethasone suppression test (DST) is a glaring example. Patients with de pression and suicidal ideation who fail to suppress cortisol secretion after the DST have been shown to be 9.2 times more at risk for committing suicide in the next 15 years of their followup. 4 This is equivalent to the association between smoking and lung cancer, but the cancer community and the public health authorities have acted and succeeded in redu cing smoking and lung cancer. 5 Nothing similar has been done as far as the DST and suicide is concerned. Another study identified a single biological marker that discriminated 100% of participants who where exposed to childhood trauma and who committed suicide from controls who did not commit suicide! 6 Was there any practical followup study for this astonishing result? None! Why is that? A lot can be said about the failures to act on strong biological findings in psychiatry, but maybe this indicates poor faith in these re sults in our own biological psychiatry research community. What is more worrisome is that we turn a blind eye to these failures. While larger networks, better science and more money could help to advance biological psychiatry, it may be very helpful to ask ourselves hard questions about the role of biological psychiatry in mental health.
Major facets in the mental health crisis
What is the second crisis in mental health? To their credit, Merali and Anisman mentioned some of the elements of the crisis in mental health. Yes, mental disorders are very preva lent and very costly. Yes, stigma -not only selfstigma, but also stigma among the general public and health providersis rampant. The crisis in mental health also has other major facets. One of the most important, at least in Canada, is that psychological and psychosocial treatments are not fully recog nized and compensated. Psychological approaches are effec tive but not supported by health care payers and are not fea tured prominently in curricula of mental health professionals, particularly psychiatrists. Even pharmacological treatments that are effective are not used as they should be. Clozapine, for example, a treatment that has been shown time and time again to be the only medication effective in treating resistant schizophrenia, is very much underused. 7 The organization of services remains fragmented, and pathways to care are tortu ous and contribute strongly to delayed care and disengage ment from services and treatment, particularly among youth. 8 Another determinant of the mental health crisis is its fail ure to act on many of its strongest findings. For example, child abuse and maltreatment, which are also very prevalent, have been shown to be associated with major depression, anxiety and psychosis. It is unclear how much mental health professionals are engaged with the public health authorities to prevent childhood abuse and maltreatment.
Finally, it could be argued that biological psychiatry has strongly contributed to the crisis in mental health, by its strong emphasis on biology and the promotion of a sim plistic model of the association between the brain and mental illnesses. The industry, with its powerful market ing force has strongly promoted the "pill solution," de spite the absence of innovation. Public funders, philan thropists and journalists are easily tempted by the idea that there will be a pill to treat each mental disorder, and the patients have also been conditioned to believe that this might be the case, which results in questionable attitudes and expectations.
Fortunately, on this crisis front, we have seen some com forting efforts to fund research directed toward a more inte grated view of mental health care in the last 10 years. For ex ample, the Mental Health Commission of Canada (MHCC) has funded the project "Chez Soi" to investigate the effects of supported housing on mental health. The Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) Strategy for PatientOriented Re search (SPOR) initiative in conjunction with the Graham Boeckh Foundation recently funded a project to transform youth mental health services in Canada (ACCESSOpen minds). While these and many others are promising good indicators, much more needs to be done.
Mental disorders are more than brain disorders
The main paradigm of biological psychiatry is that "mental disorders are brain disorders." But how we go about truly understanding this statement can make a huge difference in how we work. The dominant understanding of this paradigm follows the medical model: once the organ responsible for the disease is identified, we need to find out what is wrong in the working of that organ and subsequently fix the dysfunction to cure the disease. For psychiatric disorders, the brain is cer tainly the organ in question (this was established hundreds, if not thousands, of years ago), but unlike all other somatic ill nesses, the nature of the dysfunction leading to disordered minds turned out to be very difficult to pinpoint. The bio logical psychiatry crisis may be due to an inadequate extrapo lation of the medical model to the brain and mind. To draw a parallel that will help to clarify the inadequacy of this extrapo lation, it can be very firmly stated that molecular biology (MB) is rooted in quantum mechanics (QM). Yet, to my knowledge, no textbook has tried to propose understanding MB on the ba sis of QM. This may be because these 2 fields of science, al though the former is entirely rooted in the latter, operate with different paradigms and experimental approaches. Most im portantly, we can understand each of them and make tremen dous advances without necessarily being fixated on how QM explains MB. Coming back to biological psychiatry, it is quite easy to accept that the distance separating the brain and mind is immense compared with the one that separates QM and MB and that mental health can progress and thrive without being heavily dependent on biological psychiatry. I believe that after the serendipitous discovery of psychotropic medica tion early in the last century, biological psychiatry has contrib uted greatly to psychiatry, not so much by showing that any molecular or brain anomaly has any clinical utility for psychi atric practice, but by ushering the need for a renewed J Psychiatry Neurosci 2016;41(4) paradigm in biological psychiatry: mental disorders are much more than brain disorders! So how can biological psychiatry contribute to mental health? I believe that biological psychiatry is one of the major models helping us to chaperone our thinking and to develop part of the narrative that we use to interact with our patients and their families in their quest (and ours) to understand their mental states and how therapies, pharmacological or other wise, can help them improve their mental states. Presenting refined biological models (along with other models), while at the same time recognizing their strong limitations when ap plied to individual situations, is an important part of our mis sion and of the healing process. I also believe that biological psychiatry, presented in this renewed paradigm, can help us to educate future generations of scientists and mental health professionals, the media, funding agencies and the public about the complexity of human behaviours and the privileged place of the individual, aided by different approaches, as the central agent of change. Redefining the goals of biological psychiatry, setting the right expectations and reasonable time lines would be essential for biological psych iatry to continue its slow, but fundamental contribution. But I would be de lighted to be proven wrong about the slow pace, tomorrow!
